Authored by Suhana Roy 3rd year BA LLB student at Hidayatullah National law University
In January 2025, a Ryanair flight from London to Vilnius was diverted to Warsaw when it suffered from unexplained GPS interference. Over 800 such cases were reported in Lithuanian airspace alone in late 2024, with Estonia and Finland also voicing concerns over alleged Russian jamming of GPS signals. This interference has implications far beyond aviation, including financial systems, to communication systems. It raises serious questions under international law. Is GPS jamming considered to hold states accountable? Do such acts violate existing treaties like the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation? Moreover, how will international law evolve to govern this new form of technology? This blog ranges through various legal dimensions of GPS interference, state responsibility and the future of global navigation security.
GPS Jamming and the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation
The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944) is a basis for international aviation law that provides the standards of safety and security of air navigation across the nations. On the one hand, the treaty does not discuss GPS jamming explicitly but several of the treaty’s provisions establish clear obligations on states to protect civil aviation from any harmful interference. However, the deliberate disruption of GPS signals, in the manner that has resulted in forcing aircraft to divert or represented a safety issue, could violate several provisions of the Convention and international aviation standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organization.
Article 1 states that state sovereignty over airspace is one of the basic principles of the Convention. Within each state, its airspace is under complete and exclusive control, but this does not include actions that threaten international civil aviation. Taking deliberate steps to interfere with GPS signals may result in disruptions of navigation or, in the case of airplanes using GPS, forced diversions, and thereby interfere in the sovereignty of other states whose aircraft are subject to the disruption of flight.
Also Article 3(d) prohibits states to employ weapons or any other equivalent means for attacking civilian aircraft in a way endangering flight safety. This provision, originally meant to prevent direct assaults on civilian aircraft, could also be viewed as the indirect but quite dangerous asphyxiation of GPS jamming.
The Convention also emphasizes the need for air navigation not to be interfered with and international standards of safety to be adopted. According to Article 37, states are to conform to ICAO’s technical regulations, in particular to Annex 10 of the Chicago Convention relating to Aeronautical Telecommunications (which covers the provision of aeronautical telecommunications) and related protection of the radio signals used for navigation. Intentional jamming of GPS signals makes these protected systems too, which in turn means that an intentional jamming contaminates air navigation safety norms around the world. Further, Article 44 that states ICAO’s objectives reinforces the existence of secure and efficient air navigation world over. Any state radio jamming, particularly if it causes aviation to be jammed beyond its borders, contradicts these objectives and the legal assumptions of the Convention.
Ultimately, if a state is determined to have deliberately jammed GPS on international flights, the affected countries may look to Article 84 of the Chicago Convention to bring such disputes before ICAO’s Council. While such violations and related violations as to place its safety at risk are within the responsibility of the legislator, ICAO has the authority to investigate such violations and issue recommendations, however, it does not have direct enforcement mechanisms. Persistent violations in extreme cases could be escalated to the United Nations Security Council if such interferences threatened larger dimensions of international security. Although such GPS jamming is often conducted covertly, proving state responsibility for it is a challenging task.
State Responsibility and Cybersecurity Threats in Air Navigation
The International Law Commission (ILC) and the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) provide a framework of assessing state liability when GPS jamming takes place. According to international law, such a state would be responsible, if a deliberate disruption of GPS signals, causing risks to international aviation, has been made.
Under Article 4, it is directly imputable to the state if a government or its agencies become involved in traffic jamming of GPS. In the case that non-state actors are involved, the state could still be responsible under the Article 8 if they acted under state direction or control.
But, if GPS jamming is large enough and jeopardizes global aviation, it can be a serious breach of an erga omnes under Article 40-41 obligation. That means that every state has an interest that such actions should end, which would allow collective replies such as diplomatic measures, countermeasures.
The Tallinn Manual and GPS Jamming in Cyber Warfare
GPS jamming is one such cyber operation that the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare serves as guidance concerning its application of international law. In the Manual, intentional interference with GPS signals would mean a violation of state sovereignty if it damaged infrastructure such as air navigation systems on another state’s territory (Rule 4). Under Rule 66, which prohibits coercively interfering in another state’s inherently governmental functions (such as safety of civil air travel), could be considered unlawful if GPS jamming disrupts civil air travel, and poses safety risks.
Moreover, if GPS jamming is so excessive as to cause physical damage, for example an aircraft crash, this could fall beneath Rule 69 and breaches Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Even though no physical harm must occur, the operation could still violate due diligence obligations (Rule 6), which require states to prevent cyber activities originating from their territory, which do significant harm to other states.
If a state GPS jams as part of a military strategy or hybrid warfare, it may constitute a hostile act in an international armed conflict within the meaning of Rule 83 and the international law on IHL applies. The Tallinn Manual’s principles reiterate that GPS interference caused due to intention and will can become a legal matter under the international law and may result in state liability and countermeasures.
The Due Diligence Obligation in Cyberspace
One of the key relevant international legal principles concerning GPS jamming is the due diligence obligation, meaning that states should take all legally achievable precaution to prevent that the activities, which take place under their sovereignty, cause serious harm to other states. Both the outcome in the Corfu Channel case (ICJ, 1949) and discussion in terms of cybersecurity by the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) recognize this principle in cases in which either a state or non-state actor is engaged in disruptive cyber operations. Forcing GPS interference intentionally, particularly if it poses a danger to aviation safety, may be a failure of due diligence on part of a state if it has failed to prevent, investigate or cure such harmful interference emanating from its jurisdiction. This principle arises as a legal guarantor for the states to be held accountable, as well as a basis for countermeasures or collective responses of the affected countries.
The Strategic Race for Quantum Navigation and the Future of Global Regulation
Quantum-based navigation systems have both opportunity and challenge for their development. At the same time, these technologies present the possibility of enabling resilience toward GPS jamming for aircraft, ships and even mobile devices by giving them the capability to navigate without the need for external signals. However, technology-sharing, export controls, and national security restrictions limit the speed of developing and controlling quantum navigation.
Unlike the established navigation technologies, quantum navigation is largely unprofessional and will, in turn, bring about technological protectionism, a situation where countries that are investing in quantum navigation, such as the UK, the US, China, and Russia will limit their access to these technologies. If classified quantum navigation stays a military asset, as it currently is, the disparity between some nations who can be brusquely interrupted with GPS interference, and those who cannot, could be magnified.
In addition, there is no existing international framework to control quantum-based positioning systems. New treaties or agreements to govern the use of the emerging navigation technology can be established by organizations like the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). But getting states to come to consensus on these issues will be difficult, because states have a vested interest in keeping themselves secure as well as controlling access to advanced technology.
Conclusion: The Need for Stronger International Legal Frameworks
The risks of GPS jamming are serious for the global aviation, cybersecurity, and national security; however, current international legal instruments fall short to effectively deal with these threats. The Chicago Convention and ARSIWA are broad principles on the state responsibility, but they fail to take into consideration special problems of cyber warfare and the interference with electronic systems.
Along with states’ progression toward quantum navigation, the international public must create new regulation aimed at limitation of technological and geopolitical monopolization. Binding agreements made under ITU, ICAO or under the UN could to some extent create a guarantee that navigation technology will continue to be a global public good instead of a strategic dominance instrument.
Ultimately, the issue of GPS jamming and the future of quantum navigation is not just a legal or technical debate—it is a geopolitical struggle that will shape the future of international law, aviation security, and global power structures. Without stronger enforcement mechanisms and international cooperation, the world risks entering an era where navigation itself becomes a battlefield, undermining the very foundations of international stability and trust.
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