Inadequacy of IHL in dealing with potential weaponization of Genetic Engineering Technologies

Authored by Vanisha Mishra, Final year student at the Institute of Law, Nirma University, Ahmedabad

Summary

In this post, emphasis has been placed on the need to address the threat posed by weaponization of biotechnology in order to put an end to the development of weapons of mass destruction in the pretext of scientific experiments.

Introduction

The Biological Weapons Convention serves as a customary law for preventing the use of such weapons during warfare, however, with time it has become immaterial in the context of the new emerging technologies. The advent of Genetic Engineering technologies poses a challenge to the established customary laws and principles of International Humanitarian Law, as these techniques operate beyond the current framework of biological weapons. Although the Biological Weapons Convention has made an attempt to contain scientific technologies for peaceful purposes, it is no more contemporary with the technological advancements as it does not cater to the danger posed by evolving Genetic Engineering technologies, within its framework. The complexity of these technologies needs to be understood in order to discuss the significant threat posed by their weaponization.

Genetic Engineering Technologies

Genetic Engineering consists of a wide array of techniques that can be used to alter or modify the genetic structure of any organism. This can be achieved through various structures and combinations. In techniques such as gene editing, the modification in the genome is achieved by fracturing a specific DNA sequence, and thereafter restructuring that part to get the desired change. Either a new sequence can be inserted in the fractured part, or its own structure can be modified using gene editing technologies.One such breakthrough technological development has been achieved by the CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing tool. The advent of CRISPR-Cas9 technology has revolutionized genetic editing, offering unprecedented precision and efficiency. This tool ensures precise targeting, simplified modification, and cost-effectiveness. Furthermore, advancements in cloning technology paved the way for cloning research, which has been a major medical breakthrough and can be utilized in creating designer organisms.

Potential Weaponization of Genetic Engineering Technologies

The danger that the next-generation biological weapons pose is grave, and unlike the use of natural pathogens, the threat constituted by the development of synthetic biology towards changing the effect, mechanism and processes of these substances presents an incommensurable threat to the world. Anthrax, for instance, can now be armed with new properties which would make its transmission more quick and effective. In some cases there might also be a targeted transmission towards certain people, territories, or geographies, socially rather than through conventional kinetic means

The emergence of the new CRISPR-based gene editing technologies has transformed the landscape of genomics in organisms such as insects, and has paved the way for accelerating research in insect biology and pest management strategies. CRISPR–Cas9 is equipped with the capability to efficiently modify, delete, and insert DNA sequences in a wide range of insect species. Furthermore, the development of advanced gene editing tools like “HACK systems, DNA base-editors, site-specific chromosomal translocations, and gene drives” promise even greater versatility and efficacy in insect genome manipulation. For instance, it is completely possible to genetically modify insects that feed on crops, e.g., locus, borers, bollworms, beetles, etc., by developing their resistance towards the chemicals used in insect and pest controls. Along with resistance, gene editing technologies can also be used to improve breeding among the insects, to ensure a widespread effect on the crops of a region. This way, the technology can be very conveniently misused to create conditions of famine, especially to inflict injury and damage to the adversary in conditions of war.

Gene editing in organisms like insects and pests particularly can enhance their capacity to cause immediate injury, to a particular region, geography or type of crops. However, even in that scenario, there are no means to ensure distinction on the basis of the protected status of people, and thus no means to afford security to the civilians. Since civilians and military personnel are equally reliant on the food sources, the agricultural crops in that scenario do not serve a military objective. These attacks can be characterized as indiscriminate, as they would cause harm to people at large without any distinction between civilians and military personnel. Furthermore, the harm caused to such a food source can also lead to famine and starvation among civilians. The impact of war on civilians is further exacerbated due to the inaccessibility of basic amenities indispensable for their survival, and it leads to a grave violation of their human rights and protection accorded by International Humanitarian Law.

The effects produced by weaponization of Genetic Engineering technologies are inhumane and therefore should absolutely be prohibited by the International Humanitarian Law. Thus, it is important to recognize the need to have a framework to keep a check on the Genetic Engineering technologies and delegitimize their development and use for assault purposes, owing to their capacity to cause an excessive injury.

Inadequacy of International Humanitarian Law to Prohibit the Misuse of Genetic Engineering Technologies

The prohibition on the use of biological weapons is provided in International Humanitarian law, by the Geneva Protocol, 1925, and Biological Weapons Convention. While the Geneva Protocol deals with the prohibition on “use” of “bacteriological methods” of warfare, the Biological Weapons Convention seeks to prevent not only the “use” but also prohibits the member states to “develop”, “produce”, “stockpile” or otherwise “acquire” or “retain” any biological weapons. This prohibition further is extended to only those “microbial, biological agents, toxins”, which in the qualitative as well as quantitative context, do not serve any peaceful purpose.

Microbials are those living microorganisms which are difficult to be seen by the naked eye and include “actinomycetes, archaea, bacteria, fungi, yeast, microalgae”, etc. There’s no clear demarcation between microbial and biological agents; even some living organisms can be characterized as both. Biological agents are those organisms or proteins, which depend on a host for their multiplication and transmission, such as bacteria, viruses, etc. Whereas, toxins are those chemicals that are inanimate and are dangerous for living organisms. These classifications are the specific categories prohibited by the Convention.

It is crucial to emphasize that the convention aims at providing prohibition in the context of these specific substances. It is apparent that the convention provides for a prohibition specifically on organisms, agents or toxins. The development and any kind of acquisition or storage in context of these organisms and substances is prohibited, provided that there’s no peaceful justification for the same. The distinct characteristics of these microbials, agents and toxins make their use, accumulation or even existence in that form, potentially dangerous, and thus, the prohibition in the Convention is parallel to the associated risks. Hence, the categorical mention of microbials, agents and toxins is exhaustive and not merely illustrative.

The Convention is not inclusive of the novel technological advancements in biotechnology such as Genetic Engineering techniques, where the medium of assault is not a microorganism, a biological agent or a toxin, but rather, a more complicated life form. As assessed earlier, the Genetic Engineering techniques such as gene editing has the capacity to build a weapon of desired intensity and form. Moreover, with the easy availability of efficient gene editing technologies like CRISPR-Cas9, it is far easier to build a weapon of mass destruction.

Conclusion

The technology of Genetic Engineering has assumed a dual use role, as on one hand it can be utilized to develop cures, while on the other, it can also be used to create weapons of mass destruction. These tools can be utilized to develop offensive weapons which would act as military objects, and therefore there is a need to characterize their military use as a weapon. The current framework of International Humanitarian Law lacks the recognition of such advanced technologies. Although there is a consensus among the international community to have certain restrictions on the offensive use of Genetic Engineering, however, there’s not yet any formal recognition of the same.

The lack of inclusivity of technological advancements with the framework of the Biological Weapons Convention, has created a loophole for the nations to exploit. The nations can get involved in development and use of such offensive weapons, while still provisionally complying with the Convention. This would fail the entire purpose and objective of the Convention, i.e., to contain the dangerous use of biotechnology. The potential effect of Genetic Engineering technologies has also been classified as a “Revolution in Military Affairs“. This classification depicts the lethal nature of the Genetic Engineering technology that can be developed for military use. The weaponization of Genetic Engineering technologies can pose an incommensurable threat to world order and peace.

Therefore, a more inclusive definition of technologies needs to be included in the framework, in order to make the Convention contemporary with evolving and potentially dangerous biotechnologies. Since, these technologies have the capacity to ensure extensive, incidental as well as extended harm, it is crucial to have a framework which acknowledges and addresses the threat posed by such evolving biotechnologies.

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