Authored by Prof. Sunanda Bharti, Professor of Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Delhi, India, and a Certified Professional Mediator from the Indian Institute of Arbitration and Mediation.
Introduction
The history of the temple of Preah Vihear is complex. So is its geo-political-religious placement. It is ironic that a temple dedicated to Lord Shiva, who is a Hindu God, has been a bone of contention between Buddhist Cambodia and Thailand, where the peace is being brokered by largely atheist China.
The reason behind the standoff, though, is not simply the disputed place of worship, but much more. Thailand and Cambodia share a long land border, along one small nook of which the temple is situated. Though the ICJ had recognised Cambodia’s sovereignty over the landmass in 1962, it is still a potential trouble spot that involves issues related to national pride and brinksmanship; in fact, the latest stance of Cambodia resonates with this. The purpose of this article is to examine the implications of China’s position as mediator following the border skirmishes in November 2025 and advocate for India’s missed opportunity of its unique mediation capabilities.
Dispute Resolution and India’s Reluctance to Assume the Role of Mediator
The involvement of China, a power often associated with hegemonic or annexationist ambitions, was a less ideal situation for the two countries and for the region. What happened in November 2025 along the Cambodia-Thailand border was again a skirmish or a regional-level tension and not a full-scale war, and that is the reason why preventive negotiation would have been the ideal solution. Any other alternative involving a neutral third party should have had India in the frame. India gave the contesting countries their main religion. Consequently, there is a civilisational affinity. Aside from this, India was geopolitically better suited to mediate because of its long history of peaceful, non-nosey, non-meddlesome, self-assured and neutral existence in the region. It would have been relevant, also because of India’s non-expansionist political posture. Unfortunately, India has missed the opportunity of being the Global-South leader by maintaining a convenient distance in the matter.
Although China’s official projection is that of a neutral facilitator, one should not shut one’s eyes towards its broader geopolitical strategy. It is a fact that ASEAN is the largest trading partner of China. By jumping onto the mediation bandwagon, China may want to create its hegemony in the region and outrank other Asian nations in terms of influence and also reduce external (Western) roles. This makes its involvement multipurpose and clearly beyond conflict resolution.
Another reservation to China’s neutrality posture is centred around it being a major defence and economic partner for Cambodia and Thailand, which complicates matters. It is sufficient to make one question whether China’s mediation is truly neutral and whether it is not strategically calibrated with China having geopolitical goals beyond local peace.
The ‘ASEAN way’ has time and again proved itself to be important and anodyne. China’s presence as a mediator in the conflict is going to weaken the ‘ASEAN way’ further. In fact, China may, in the process, create new negotiation norms or parallel frameworks with greater Chinese leverage and lesser or negligible ASEAN multilateralism.
From what has been reported in the media, Cambodia’s interests seem to show the world that its ruling party can defend national sovereignty against a militarily stronger neighbour. It also looks to placate nationalists without appearing to cave in. Thailand’s interests look like it wants to avoid a political backlash. The underlying interest of both parties seems to have one common point, that is, to achieve a convenient compromise through mediation, without looking weak.
Mutually Costly BATNAs and the Case for Direct Negotiations
Cambodia’s probable Best Alternative to the Negotiation Agreement (BATNA) might be to continue with its de facto control over most of the disputed territory and build a narrative that gets international support. In fact latest news where Cambodia is seen exhorting for international attention on the destruction of parts of the temple structure, validates this point. If mediation fails, Thailand’s fallback is likely to be a status quo on the stalemate, while allowing repeated, albeit limited escalation without taking the risk of a full-blown war. Since both BATNAs are painful and mutually damaging, it would make sense for the countries to quickly move from a dispute resolution to a deal-making situation, preferably through direct good-faith negotiations. This would diminish the risk of external parties converting a bilateral discord into an arena for geopolitical leverage. This also demands moving beyond the question of who is right under history/legal precedent and who owns what.
Suggestions and way forward
Instead of fighting over final sovereignty now, Cambodia and Thailand can agree on keeping the sovereignty claims in temporary abeyance.These areas may become jointly administered zones with shared policies for access, revenue, conservation, tourism, and local development.
Much like the Sapeliga Community Peace Committee in Ghana, a Local Border Peace Council may be established in the near future, comprising local leaders, civil society, cultural custodians, tourism operators, etc., drawn from both countries, with an aim to meet regularly, talk about problems happening at the border, report dangers early, and stop fights before they escalate. The idea moves on the presumption that the one who is closest to the conflict knows best how to resolve it.
Local peace committees with hotline access to central governments cannot replace high-level negotiations, but they can help defuse flare-ups. It is suggested that layered negotiation be tried in such high-stakes matters. When responsibility is shared and spread, the weight or apprehension of a complete peace collapse lessens.
Conclusion
The case of Preah Vihear serves as proof that letting bilateral relations between countries be controlled by aggressive external forces could prove very risky indeed. Although China’s involvement in mediating the matter is ongoing, it poses a potential threat to ASEAN centrality and its multilateral approach.
It would bode well for India if it does not side-step in such matters but leads the way, as a true strategic partner of ASEAN should. To continue deploying the policy of non-interference may be sufficient to maintain good political or diplomatic relationships, but it presents a missed opportunity when it comes to being seen as a key stabilising factor in the region.
Ultimately, for there to be sustained peace in the region, it is imperative that Cambodia and Thailand take a step back from involving other parties and focus on resolving their disputes through negotiations within the region. At the same time, this scenario should also ring alarm bells for India, which needs to come out of its policy of non-interference if it wants to play the role of a strategic partner in ASEAN.
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